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1. Introduction
Prisoner numbers are on the rise for decades in the US and many Euro-
pean countries.1 The increasing prisoner population puts the existing United
Kingdom (UK) Criminal Justice System (CJS) under stress and forces policy
makers to reconsider the limits both from a cost-per-place and from social
perspectives (i.e., providing humane incarceration with prospects for reinte-
gration into society when released). Current public policy mainly consists
of building new prisons, reshaping existing prisons and putting less convicts
behind bars.
This paper focuses on what we call the potential ‘prison size dilemma’.
Since public policy makers could consider returns to scale from either a cost-
per-place or a social viewpoint, these two viewpoints could potentially lead
to conflicting opinions on the optimal scale size of a prison. We empirically
test whether the optimal scale size of a prison differs when the focus is either
on costs-per-place, quality of life in prison or successful reintegration. In
particular, we study economies of scale of a sample of male prisons in England
and Wales, by using publicly available data collected by the Ministry of
Justice (MoJ).
Our empirical analysis is timely and warranted as the building of the
first titan prison in the UK has started. The name titan refers to not just
a single large prison but one consisting of hubs (Lockyer, 2013, page 6).
The Labour government in 2007 was forced to abandon 3 titan prisons which
would provide up to 2,500 places in five units of approximately 500 offenders.
However, the rejection of building these titan prisons was reversed in 2011
under the next UK government - a Conservative/Liberal coalition - where
the building of the first titan prison based in Wrexham, Wales was agreed to
begin.
Renewing and rescaling the prison estate is part of the strategy of the Na-
tional Offender Management Service (NOMS), which covers both the prison
and probation systems in England and Wales, to reduce costs. The modern-
ization of the prison estate includes the closure of old and inefficient prisons,
1See Levitt (1996) and Campbell et al. (2015) for a discussion on US mass incarceration
and e.g. the National Audit Office (2013, p. 14) for prisoner figures for England and Wales.
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which will be replaced by new large prisons and housing blocks.2
The cost reduction strategy of the NOMS, initiated in 2010, also involved
a reduction of input waste within the system. Furthermore, the NOMS aimed
to introduce more competition by privatization and re-tendering of prisons
that were already tendered to the private sector. Rogge et al. (2015) docu-
ment that there is little empirical support for large cost savings contracting-
out prison service to private-run organizations. In our study, we analyze the
optimal scale size of prisons.
We advocate a framework that is specially tailored to analyze the multidi-
mensional prison production process. In particular, we propose a DEA-based
methodology with an axiomatic basis that fully acknowledges that returns to
scale can differ between the different (qualitative) dimensions of production.
We build on the work of Cherchye et al. (2013), who introduce a multi-
output methodology that recognizes that each output is characterized by its
own production technology. Starting from this multi-output methodology,
we will be able to estimate output-specific returns to scale.
An attractive feature of the methodology is that it is nonparametric: there
is no need to assume a specific functional representation of the production
technology. This is warranted for public sector applications as public firms
operate in non-competitive markets and can have a complex structure of
public production. Consequently, the imposition of a parametric functional
relationship can be intricate. Instead, a minimum set of production axioms
is used to test for output-specific economies of scale.
From a methodological perspective, we contribute to the literature by
showing that, by making full use of the flexibility of recently introduced
production models, we can obtain a multi-output methodology that allows
for varying returns to scale over outputs. As such, we can avoid a potential
misspecification bias that can result from falsely imposing the assumption
of non-varying scale economies over the multiple outputs. This is relevant,
2On January 10, 2013, The Ministry of Justice announced the closure of four prisons
and partial closure of three prisons. In total, 2,614 places were closed. An announcement
on September 4, 2013 showed an even more drastic change of the prison landscape as in
the period 2010-2014, the prison (planned) closures consist in total of 6,382 places and
total gained places in micro-prisons (housing blocks) or new large prisons are up to 5,945.
For more information, see URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/modernisation-
of-the-prison-estate.
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as similar size dilemmas are widely debated in both the public and private
sector. That is, related public-sector examples include the debate on re-
scaling courts (Peyrache and Zago, 2015) and regional police forces (Drake
and Simper, 2002; Verschelde and Rogge, 2012). A private-sector example is
the debate on re-scaling bank branches (see the review of Fethi and Pasiouras
(2010)).
In the context of prisons, we argue that it is crucial to consider output-
specific returns to scale. In line with the key performance areas as posed
by the Ministry of Justice (see Section 3), we take three output objectives
into account. Naturally, we consider the incarceration of convicts as one of
the main outputs of a prison. Besides incarcerating convicts, we consider in
our study also qualitative outputs including the provision of a humane prison
environment and successful reintegration. In the empirical analysis, we select
proxies that in our opinion best reflect these output objectives.
A common motivation for large prisons is a reduction of the cost-per-
place. Meanwhile, opponents fear little prospects for reintegration and low
quality of life in large-scale prisons. For example, Liebling (2004) questions
the moral performance of the so called ‘Titan’ prisons that could hold over
2,500 prisoners. In fact, the HM Chief Inspector of Prisons (2009) and The
National Audit Office (2013) provide support in England and Wales for a
better performance in smaller prisons. Surveys show that prisoners tend to
be more engaged in smaller establishments. Moreover small prisons do on
average better in independent inspections and in the NOMS’s performance
ratings, which take reintegration and quality of life in prison into account.
By contrast, Lockyer (2013) argues that the age and not the size of a prison
determines the performance of a prison. In our opinion there is a need for
further research on the relation between prison size and the multiple facets
of performance. Doing so, we control for differences in the age of the prison
by including prison age as an environmental variable in the analysis.
Ruggiero (2000) emphasizes that environmental variables have a consid-
erable impact on the provision of public services and that without controlling
for these environmental factors the estimates of returns to scale will be biased.
We advocate a methodology that explicitly takes into account environmental
heterogeneity (in contrast to the above mentioned studies). In particular,
we control for prison(er) and regional characteristics. For example, next to
prison age and prison management, we control in our study for the inflow
of prisoners in a particular establishment. Specifically, we include the pre-
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dicted rate of re-offending in an establishment. The rate of re-offending is
estimated at prison level by the Ministry of Justice, based on prisoner-level
data on social background, ethnicity, crime type, etc.
Furthermore, the proposed methodology distinguishes between discre-
tionary and non-discretionary output variables. We therefore measure the
performance of prisons only with respect to the output variables that the
prison management controls and actually wants to maximize. Examples of
non-discretionary variables in our application are the size of the average
prison population and the yearly number of discharges.
To our knowledge, we posit an original estimation strategy that ade-
quately models the multidimensional prison production process. The ad-
vocated methodology is tailored to all specificities of the prison production
process and enables us to meaningfully answer the prison size dilemma, by
using publicly available data. Moreover, we discuss in detail how public
policy makers can further refine the analysis by adding information on the
allocation of expenses to particular outputs.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains
the nonparametric multi-output methodology. Section 3 discusses the data
and the empirical model and section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 con-
cludes.
2. Methodology
To set the stage, we first intuitively introduce the concept of returns to
scale. The concept of returns to scale is directly related to the most pro-
ductive scale size. A Decision Making Unit (DMU) that is situated on the
constant returns to scale technology, is considered to operate on its most pro-
ductive scale size (Banker, 1984). A DMU which is not situated on its most
productive scale size, can improve its productivity by resizing the scale of its
operations. The type of returns to scale can be interpreted as the direction
of change necessary to achieve its most productive scale size.3 Increasing
returns to scale indicate that the most productive scale size of a DMU is
situated at a larger size. Similarly, decreasing returns to scale indicate that
the DMU should decrease the scale of its operations to achieve the optimal
scale size. The type of returns to scale is therefore very useful information for
3We estimate global returns to scale. See Podinovski (2004a) and Podinovski (2004b)
for a discussion on the distinction between local and global returns to scale.
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the operational manager, indicating how rescaling the operation can improve
average productivity and reduce the average cost.4
To estimate output-specific returns to scale, we build on the work of
Cherchye et al. (2013), who introduce a multi-output methodology that rec-
ognizes that each output is characterized by its own production technology.
The output-specific production technologies remain linked through the use of
joint inputs. In Sections 2.2 to 2.4 we will focus on the production process of
one particular output, to come back to the multi-output production process
in Section 2.5. We extend Cherchye et al. (2013) by including alternative
returns to scale assumptions in the methodology. At this point, it might be
worth to note that our approach bears some analogy to Cook and Zhu (2011),
who also allow returns to scale type behavior to be different for one output
subgroup than for another, by using the notion of component technologies.
However, we offer an axiomatic approach to the estimation of output-specific
returns to scale.
Furthermore, we include output-specific environmental variables in the
methodology. Since we are able to work with output-specific production
technologies, we can estimate output-specific returns-to-scale, controlling for
output-specific environments. For ease of exposition, we will assume in sec-
tions 2.2 to 2.5 that all DMUs are situated in the same environment and
introduce environmental influences later in section 2.6.
2.1. Notational preliminaries
Suppose we observe data for N DMUs. Each DMU n (1 ≤ n ≤ N)
uses input xn = (x
1
n, . . . , x
L
n) to produce output yn = (y
1
n, . . . ,y
R
n ) and is
situated in environment zn = (z
1
n, . . . , z
K
n ). Note that output y
r
n can be a set
of outputs having a common production technology.
Following Cherchye et al. (2013) and Cherchye et al. (2015), we distin-
guish between output-specific, joint and subjoint inputs. Output-specific
inputs can be allocated to the production of particular outputs. We use αrl ,
4We estimate qualitative characterizations of returns to scale, such as increasing, de-
creasing or constant returns to scale. There is a different strand of DEA literature which
is directed to quantitative directions of returns to scale. For example Podinovski and
Forsund (2010) and Atici and Podinovski (2012) analyze a class of mixed partial elasticity
measures. These measures indicate the elasticity of response of a subset of outputs with
respect to marginal changes of a subset of inputs.
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with
∑R
r=1 α
r
l=1, to represent the fraction of input l that is used to produce
output r. Next, joint (or public) inputs simultaneously benefit the produc-
tion of all outputs. Subjoint inputs also figure as joint inputs, but only for a
subset of outputs. The use of joint and subjoint inputs therefore makes the
output-specific production processes interdependent. Note that the method-
ology can also be applied when all inputs are joint (as is the case in our
empirical analysis).
We summarize the information on how inputs are allocated to outputs by
means of a vector Ar for each output r. Specifically, (Ar)l = α
r
l if input l
is output-specific and used to produce output r. Next, (Ar)l = 1if input l is
joint or sub-joint and used to produce output r. Finally, (Ar)l = 0 otherwise.
The element-by-element product Xr = Ar  x captures the input quantities
used in the production process of output r.
Next, some environmental variables can influence only a part of the out-
puts, not all. The vector Br captures the environmental variables that are
relevant for output r. In particular, (Br)k = 1 if environmental variable k is
relevant for output r and (Br)k = 0 otherwise. Summarizing, the element-
by-element product Zr = Br  z captures the environmental variables that
are controlled for in the specification of the technology of output r.
Taken together, the empirical analysis starts from the following data set:
S = {(y1n, . . . ,yRn ,X1n, . . . ,XRn ,Z1n, . . . ,ZRn ) | n = 1, . . . , N}. (1)
2.2. Output-specific production technology
We focus on the production technology of output r. For output r, we
observe for each DMU n the inputs Xrn that are used to produce output
yrn. We adopt an output-oriented approach
5 and characterize the production
technology of output r by output sets P r(Xr), which contains the amount of
output yr that can be produced with input Xr.
P r(Xr) = {yr|Xr can produce yr}. (2)
In practice, the true output sets P r(Xr) are not observed. A solution is
to construct empirical approximations of these output sets on the basis of
some standard production axioms.
5In this respect we deviate from Cherchye et al. (2013), who follow an input oriented
approach and characterize the production technology by input requirement sets.
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Axiom 1 (Monotone output sets).
yr ∈ P r(Xr) and yr∗ ≤ yr ⇒ yr∗ ∈ P r(Xr)
Axiom 2 (Nested output sets).
Xr ≤ Xr∗ ⇒ P r(Xr) ⊂ P r(Xr∗)
Axiom 3 (Convex output sets).
yr ∈ P r(Xr) and yr∗ ∈ P r(Xr)⇒ ∀λ ∈ [0, 1] : λyr + (1− λ)yr∗ ∈ P r(Xr)
Axiom 4 (Observability means feasibility).
(yr,Xr) ∈ S ⇒ yr ∈ P r(Xr).
Essentially, the first two axioms say that inputs and outputs are freely
disposable. Axiom 3 states that, if input Xr can produce both output yr
and yr∗, then it can also produce any convex combination of these outputs.
We work in a setting with relaxed convexity assumptions: we assume convex
output sets, but we do not impose convexity in the input-output space. A
growing strand of literature assumes a weaker form of convexity, see Podi-
novski and Kuosmanen (2011) for an overview. The motivation is that a
fully convex production set is not well suited for modeling economies of scale
(Petersen (1990) and Bogetoft (1996)). Axiom 4 states that the observed
input-output combinations are certainly feasible.
We add one final axiom, which includes returns to scale in the methodol-
ogy. We assume either variable returns to scale (vrs), non-increasing returns
to scale (nirs), non-decreasing returns to scale (ndrs) or constant returns to
scale (crs). We include rtsr in the notation of the output set, indicating
which returns to scale assumption we make for output r.
Axiom 5 (Output-specific returns to scale).
yr ∈ P r(Xr, rtsr)⇒ kyr ∈ P r(kXr, rtsr) for k ∈ K(rtsr)
where rtsr=‘vrs’, ‘nirs’, ‘ndrs’, or ‘crs’ and
where K(vrs) = {1}, K(nirs) = [0, 1], K(ndrs) = [1,∞) and K(crs) = R0.
The returns to scale assumption describes the change in output result-
ing from a proportional change in inputs. If input Xr can produce output
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yr, then kXr can produce kyr for k ∈ K(rtsr). Depending on which re-
turns to scale assumption that is made, the potential to scale up or down
differs. Variable returns to scale is the weakest assumption, under which
the input-output combinations can not be scaled. Under the assumption of
non-increasing returns to scale, we can scale down the observations. Simi-
larly, the assumption of non-decreasing returns to scale enables us to scale
up the observations. Constant returns to scale is the strongest assumption
and allows to scale both up and down.
We define the empirical approximation Pˆ r(Xrn, rts
r) of the output set as
the smallest set that is consistent with Axioms 1-5. This is an application of
the minimum extrapolation principle which is commonly used in DEA, see
Banker et al. (1984).
Illustrative example. Before giving a formal definition of the empirically con-
structed output set, we illustrate the construction with a single input, single
output example, which is depicted in Figure 1.
xr
yr
vrs
A
B
C
xr
yr
crs
A
B
C
ndrs
xr
yr
A
B
C
xr
yr
nirs
A
B
C
Figure 1: Production technology under variable, non-increasing, non-decreasing
and constant returns to scale.
We observe the input-output combinations of DMU A, B and C. The grey
area displays the technology set. The relation between the technology set T r
and the output sets P r(Xr, rtsr) is the following: T r = {(Xr,yr, rtsr)|yr ∈
P r(Xr, rtsr)}. Along a vertical line we can therefore read an output set, for
a particular input level.
In a first step in the construction, we apply Axiom 4, observability means
feasibility. This axiom indicates that the technology set is constructed on the
basis of the observed input-output combinations A, B and C. In a second step,
Axioms 1 and 2 imply that the input-output combinations to the bottom
right of A, B and C are feasible. Since we only have one output in our
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example, Axiom 3 adds no additional information here. In a setting with
one output, our technology corresponds to a free disposal hull technology.
The free disposal hull (FDH) model (see Deprins et al. (1984) and Tulkens
(1993)) does not require convexity, in contrast to the popular DEA model.
In a final step, we include the returns to scale assumption. Figure 1 shows
the technology sets under the four alternative returns to scale assumptions.
Formal construction. Petersen (1990) and Bogetoft (1996) define a scaling
function βrs , which brings the production of DMU s on a similar scale as the
production of DMU n:
βrs(·, rtsr) : R0 → R0 ∪ {−∞}
where
βrs(X
r, rtsr) = sup{β | βXrs ≤ Xr, β ∈ K(rtsr)},
where we let sup(∅) = −∞. The scaling parameter βrs(Xrn, rtsr) relates
the amount of input of DMU n to the input of DMU s and implies that
βrs(X
r
n, rts
r)yrs ∈ P r(Xrn, rtsr) for a finite value of β. The scaling parameter
therefore determines to what extent we should scale the output produced by
DMU s for the scaled output of DMU s to figure as a benchmark for DMU
n. The empirical output sets Pˆ r(Xrn, rts
r) are then constructed on the basis
of the scaled observations:
Pˆ r(Xrn, rts
r) =
{
y
∣∣∣∣∣ y ≤
∑
s∈Crn(rtsr) λ
r
sβ
r
s(X
r
n, rts
r)yrs∑
s∈Crn(rtsr) λ
r
s = 1, λ
r
s ≥ 0
}
,
with Crn(rts
r) = {s|βrs(Xrn, rtsr) > 0} the set of comparison partners for
DMU n with respect to output r. Proposition 1 states that the output sets
Pˆ r satisfy the minimum extrapolation principle, under Axioms 1 to 5.
Proposition 1. Pˆ r(Xrn, rts
r) satisfies Axioms 1 - 5. Moreover, for any
P r(Xrn, rts
r) that satisfies Axioms 1 - 5, we have Pˆ r(Xrn, rts
r) ⊆ P r(Xrn, rtsr).
The set Pˆ r(Xrn, rts
r) thus gives an inner bound approximation of the
true output set P r(Xrn, rts
r), under the given technology axioms. We refer
to Appendix A for the proof of Proposition 1. Now that we have constructed
empirical approximations of the output sets, we can define output-specific
efficiency.
10
2.3. Output-specific technical efficiency
Following Banker and Morey (1986), we allow for both discretionary and
non-discretionary outputs. We therefore divide the vector yrn in a discre-
tionary and a non-discretionary part: yrn = (yD
r
n,yF
r
n). We assume that
both discretionary and non-discretionary outputs can be scaled. Although
the original Banker and Morey model does not allow scaling for the non-
discretionary part, a commonly used version of the model does allow scaling.
See Syrja¨nen (2004) for a discussion on non-discretionary factors and scale
in data envelopment analysis.
We define the following Farrell (1957) - Debreu (1951) efficiency measure
for the production of output r:
ϕˆrn(rts
r) = max{ϕ|(ϕyDrn,yF rn) ∈ Pˆ r(Xrn, rtsr)}, (3)
The measure ϕˆrn(rts
r) captures the distance of DMU n to the boundary
of the empirically constructed output set. Stated differently, ϕˆrn(rts
r) indi-
cates the equiproportionate expansion of discretionary output that is cer-
tainly feasible, under Axioms 1 - 5. In general, 1 ≤ ϕˆrn(rtsr) with ϕˆrn(rtsr) =
1 indicating full output-specific technical efficiency. Since Pˆ r(Xrn, rts
r) ⊆
P r(Xrn, rts
r), the measure ϕˆrn(rts
r) defines a lower bound for the true, but
unobserved measure ϕrn (with respect to the true, but unobserved output set
P r(Xrn, rts
r)).
The measure ϕˆrn(rts
r) is straightforward to compute by a two-step pro-
cedure. In a first step, compute the values of the functions βrs(X
r
n, rts
r) and
the DMUs in the set Crn(rts
r). In a second step, the measure ϕˆrn(rts
r) can
be computed by solving the following linear programming problem:
ϕˆrn(rts
r) = max
ϕn≥0,λrs≥0
ϕn
s.t.
(D-1)
∑
s∈Crn(rtsr)
λrsβ
r
s(X
r
n, rts
r)yD
r
s ≥ ϕnyDrn
(D-2)
∑
s∈Crn(rtsr)
λrsβ
r
s(X
r
n, rts
r)yF
r
s ≥ yF rn
(D-3)
∑
s∈Crn(rtsr)
λrs = 1
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2.4. Output-specific returns to scale
To estimate returns to scale, we follow a method discussed by Podinovski
(2004a) and Podinovski (2004b), based on Kerstens and Vanden Eeckaut
(1999). For both observations on the production frontier and below the fron-
tier, it is possible to determine the returns to scale. In the second case, we
actually estimate the returns to scale of the projection of the (inefficient)
observation on the production frontier. To determine the most appropriate
returns to scale assumption, we asses the efficiency of the observation with re-
spect to several production technologies, each based on an alternative returns
to scale assumption. Since each output has its own production technology,
we can estimate returns to scale for every individual output.
Traditionally, returns to scale are said to be either constant, increasing or
decreasing. In a setting of relaxed convexity assumptions, Podinovski (2004a)
and Podinovski (2004b) introduce a fourth option, namely sub-constant re-
turns to scale. Sub-constant returns to scale indicate that the most produc-
tive scale size can be achieved by either reducing or increasing its scale. The
identification of the returns to scale is based on the definition of the variable,
non-increasing and non-decreasing returns to scale technologies:
• Constant returns to scale ⇔ ϕˆrn(vrs) = ϕˆrn(nirs) = ϕˆrn(ndrs)
• Decreasing returns to scale ⇔ ϕˆrn(vrs) ≤ ϕˆrn(nirs) < ϕˆrn(ndrs)
• Increasing returns to scale ⇔ ϕˆrn(vrs) ≤ ϕˆrn(ndrs) < ϕˆrn(nirs)
• Sub-constant returns to scale ⇔ ϕˆrn(vrs) < ϕˆrn(ndrs) = ϕˆrn(nirs)
Finally, to quantify output-specific scale efficiency, we follow Banker (1984)
and we define a measure of scale efficiency as the ratio of the output-specific
technical efficiency measure under constant returns to scale and the measure
under variable returns to scale:
SErn = ϕˆ
r
n(crs)/ϕˆ
r
n(vrs).
Comparing these efficiency measures gives an indication of the extent to
which a DMU deviates from the point of optimal scale of operation.
Continuing the illustrative example displayed in Figure 1, we estimate
that DMU A exhibits increasing returns to scale and DMU C decreasing
returns to scale. DMU B exhibits constant returns to scale and therefore has
a scale efficiency equal to 1.
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2.5. Multi-output technical efficiency
Until now we focused on the production process of the individual outputs.
However, the production of the individual outputs is linked through the use
of joint (and subjoint) inputs. Following Cherchye et al. (2013) we define
in this section multi-output efficiency measures that consider the production
of all the outputs. An interesting feature of this methodology is that it
allows for returns to scale that are specific to individual outputs. The vector
rts = (rts1, . . . , rtsR) captures the returns to scale assumptions rtsr for every
output r. We define
ϕˆn(rts) = max{ϕ|∀r : (ϕyDrn,yF rn) ∈ Pˆ r(Xrn, rtsr)}. (4)
In practice, this multi-output technical efficiency measure is computed as
follows:
ϕˆn(rts) = min{ϕˆ1n(rts1), . . . , ϕˆRn (rtsR)}. (5)
2.6. Robust methodology with environmental variables
Since the estimation of returns to scale is sensitive to outliers, we combine
our methodology with the robust order-m method, as introduced by Cazals
et al. (2002), discussed in Daraio and Simar (2007a) and elaborated for convex
technologies in Daraio and Simar (2007b). The robust measure is computed
by repeatedly drawing a sample of potential comparison partners for DMU
n. For each random draw, we estimate the efficiency and the returns to scale
of DMU n. The robust efficiency measure is then computed as the average
over all draws. This procedure allows us to report the statistical significance
of the estimations, which is based of the percentage of draws that leads to a
particular returns to scale estimate. When discussing the estimation results,
we will report the most frequently estimated type of returns to scale and the
corresponding significance.
The robust order-m method is also well-suited to include environmen-
tal variables in the analysis using kernel weighting (see Daraio and Simar
(2005)).6 With this approach, we repeatedly draw a sample of size m (with
replacement), whereby DMUs in a similar environment as the DMU under
evaluation will have a larger probability to be drawn as a reference DMU.
6An alternative approach to account for environmental variables in a nonparametric
efficiency evaluation, is to conduct a two-step procedure. However, this involves a separa-
bility assumption. See Simar and Wilson (2007) for an insightful discussion.
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This approach is particularly interesting in the absence of information on the
direction of influence of environmental factors. Furthermore, the suggested
approach can be used to examine the effect of environmental factors. We refer
to Appendix C for technical details on the estimation of the robust efficiency
measure and how to examine the influence of environmental factors.
3. Empirical prison production model
For the empirical analysis of the prison size dilemma, we collected pub-
licly available data, provided by the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), on 34 prisons
in England and Wales. In England and Wales, prisons are divided into cat-
egories based on the severity of crime committed by inmates and the risk
should the person escape. In order to obtain a sample that is sufficiently
comparable, we focus on local male category B and C prisons. We collected
data over the book years 2009/10, 2010/11 and 2011/12 and pool the data
over the years to obtain 102 observations. By pooling the data, we impose
that all observations operate under the same technology, but still allow they
can vary with respect to returns to scale, scale efficiency and technical effi-
ciency.
The empirical literature on prison efficiency estimation is scarce. Papers
analyzing penitentiary institutions using DEA include Butler and Johnson
(1997), who measure prison efficiency in the state of Michigan, Nyhan (2002)
who consider juvenile justice facilities in the state of Florida, Hall et al. (2013)
who assess Young Offender Institutions (YOIs) in England and Wales and
Rogge et al. (2015) who assess various forms of efficiency of category B and
C male prisons in England and Wales.
Depending on the setting and research question, these studies use a vary-
ing range of inputs and outputs. Though, there is consensus that national or
regional crime figures should not be directly included as an output of a prison.
A well-established literature, inspired by the seminal work of Becker (1968),
shows positive, but highly accelerating diminishing returns from more incar-
cerations to reduce crime (See e.g. Levitt (1996), Buonanno and Raphael
(2013), Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2013), Vollaard (2013), Hansen (2015)
and references therein). However, it hard to disentangle the effects of in-
dividual prisons on crime rates. Moreover, crime figures relate to many
outside prison characteristics such as neighbourhood-level and region-level
socio-economic and demographic characteristics, the functioning of police
and probation departments, etc.
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We base our empirical model on the definition of the key prison perfor-
mance areas as posed by the Ministry of Justice. The four key prison perfor-
mance areas are (1) public protection, (2) decency, (3) reducing re-offending
and (4) resource Management and operational effectiveness (see Ministry of
Justice (2015)). The NOMS Prison Rating System creates a composite in-
dex of prison performance, based on imposing a priori chosen weights on
quantitative and qualitative information that relates to the key performance
areas. By construction, the PRS is not based on a production model that
relates input(s) to outputs. Consequently, the PRS does not allow for testing
(output-specific) economies of scale.
For the purpose of our scale (dis-)economies analysis, we analyze prison
production in a multi-output production framework and we abstain from a
priori imposing weights. We presume that the local prisons use resources —
that come from different sources — to maximize three outputs: (1) Keeping
convicts outside society, which we label as “incarceration”, (2) To provide a
humane prison environment and prepare prisoners for reintegration mainly by
organizing purposeful and outside-cell activities, (3) Successfully reintegrat-
ing discharged prisoners into society.7 As such, the key performance areas
public protection, decency and reducing re-offending are covered by our three
outputs. The fourth key performance area is captured by our multi-output
production model. Figure 2 shows the empirical prison model we advocate to
approximate the true conduct in local prisons in England and Wales, which
is by nature multi-dimensional and complex.
As prisons do not operate in vacuum, we control for both regional and
prison(er) characteristics, which we allow to be output-specific. As not all
aspects of production are controllable for prison management, we distin-
guish between ‘discretionary ’ and ‘non-discretionary ’ output variables. Non-
discretionary output variables are non-discretionary for the prison manage-
ment, but are discretionary for higher-level decision makers such as the MoJ.
This implies the non-discretionary outputs, in contrast to environmental vari-
ables, can be re-scaled to improve scale efficiency.
7While there is some discussion in the literature on whether harsh prison conditions
have a deterrence effect (Katz et al. (2003)), we follow the MoJ and consider efforts to
foster reintegration and quality of prison life as ‘goods’. In England and Wales it is now
fully acknowledged that the high proportion of offenders that re-offend is costly to the tax
payers and society (see e.g. Ministry of Justice (2011, 2013, 2015).)
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Figure 2: Empirical prison production model
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for each of the included prison-year
level variables. To approximate the inputs, outputs and environmental het-
erogeneity, we use proxies that are used in policy making and in our opinion
best reflect the true production process:
Overall resource expenditures. We include in the model overall expenditures
as joint input (tabulated in Table 1 per prisoner), which also includes outside-
prison expenditures of collaborating agencies. We thus fully acknowledge
that prisons in England and Wales are not stand alone institutions. They
closely collaborate with institutions that strife for improving re-integration
and reducing re-offending risk (i.e., MAPPA, the Probation Service and Pri-
mary Care Trusts). The expenditures are deflated to allow for comparison
over time. We used the GDP deflator at market prices for financial years
as provided by the HM Treasury and use restated versions of the overall
expenditures that improve comparability over time.
A substantial part of the expenditures within prison is payroll. In 2010/11,
49 percent of overall costs relate to direct payroll costs (Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, Ref. 72845/11), resulting in a correlation between overall resource
expenditures and staff of 0.94. As overall resources is a more complete mea-
sure of prison input, we do not include prison officers or total staff separately
into the analysis.
Prison officers traditionally keep inmates secure and maintain order. How-
ever, prison officers also promote anti-bullying and suicide prevention poli-
cies, take part in programmes to help prisoners reflect on their offending be-
haviour and prepare inmates for release through rehabilitation programmes.
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We therefore consider the expenditures by prison, of which a large part goes
to payroll, as a joint input, which simultaneously contributes to the produc-
tion of all outputs.
Nevertheless, there is room for refining the analysis and increasing the dis-
criminatory power of the proposed model by allocating resources to outputs.
In principle, the methodology allows to include both joint and output-specific
expenses in the analysis. For this to be possible, the MoJ could construct
a data set – which is consistent over time and over prisons – that breaks
down the overall prison costs. For particular costs, allocation to outputs
is straightforward. For example, the costs of food provision (which is fre-
quently outsourced) can be allocated to the incarceration output. Costs of
lecturers, workshop places, material and leaders can be attributed to the
provision of activities. Administrative costs related to the discharges and
re-integration into society could be attributed to the particular output on
successful re-integration. Further, as many prisons collaborate with outside-
prison organizations to provide out-of-cell activities and re-integration pro-
grams, the contractual agreements can be used to allocate resources to the
outputs concerning purposeful activities and successful re-integration. How-
ever, for a substantial part of costs, allocation is less straightforward. To
structure the input allocation to the multiple outputs, we advocate the use
of ’activity based costing ’ (ABC, see Cooper and Kaplan (1988)). The dis-
tinguishing feature of ABC is that costs are first attributed to activities and
subsequently, these activity costs are allocated to the outputs. In compari-
son to other costing methodologies, which often are based on the produced
output quantities, ABC gives a much clearer and more accurate picture of
the production model of the multi-output decision making unit, see Cher-
chye et al. (2013). As such, ABC offers a framework to allocate expenses to
particular outputs.
Incarceration. To approximate the daily operations and administrative work
that are needed to keep convicts outside society, we consider the places the
prison offers to incarcerate prisons. In particular, we consider the Certified
Normal Accommodation (CNA). By the Prison Act 1952, confining prisoners
is only allowed in accommodation which is certified by an inspector that
considers among others size, lighting, heating, communication-possibilities.
Certified Normal Accommodation reflects the number of places the prison
should not exceed (Prison Rules, 1999; rule 26). The respective cells are
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available for immediate use. Damaged cells, cells affected by building works
and cells taken out of use due to staff shortages are excluded.
Activities. We simplify the provision of a humane prison environment and
preparation for reintegration to organizing purposeful and outside-cell ac-
tivities. We include the total hours of purposeful activity per week8 as an
indicator of the effort during imprisonment that is taken to ‘break the cycle’
by getting the prisoners to work and train outside their cell (see Ministry of
Justice (2011)). In addition, we include time outside-cell9 to fully acknowl-
edge the beneficial aspects of other outside-cell activities such as sports and
recreation. The average prison population is included as non-discretionary
output (which is non-discretionary to prison management but can be rescaled
by higher-level decision makers) to control for the quantity of inmates for
which purposeful and outside-cell activities can be provided.
Note that the average prison population in the sample is generally higher
than the number of places according to the certified normal accommodation.
We refer to Rogge et al. (2015) for a discussion on capacity (over)-utilization.
Overcrowding is a well-known issue in UK prisons and can make rehabilita-
tion more difficult as prisoners have reduced access to purposeful activity.
We therefore include the average prison population as a non-discretionary
variable for the activities output, to control for the number of prisoners that
take part in purposeful activities, but without assuming that policy makers
have the intention to maximize the average prison population (which could
lead to overcrowding). The study of the discretionary and non-discretionary
aspects of overcrowding goes beyond this paper. For the output incarcera-
tion, the variable Certified Normal Accommodation is preferred over average
prison population as it directly measures the operational capacity of a prison
to incarcerate convicts.
Successful reintegration. Successful reintegration is proxied by focusing on
employment at discharge. Employment at release is a direct indicator of
successful reintegration. Promoting employment at release is challenging.
8This is calculated as the average number of hours purposeful activity per prisoner
per week times the average prison population. This output follows Nyhan (2002) who
also used a like variable “percentage of all youths who successfully completed the required
program or were transferred to aftercare or to a less restrictive level.” (page. 429).
9This is calculated as 24 minus the average time within cell per prisoner, times the
average prison population.
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At most, 44 percent of prisoners have employment at release date. The
number of discharges is included as non-discretionary output to control for
the quantity of offenders that are released. Local prisons hold offenders with
short sentences resulting in more discharges than the yearly average prison
population.
Regional characteristics. Successful reintegration also highly depends on the
socio-economic environment in which prisoners are reintegrated. As this
study deals with local prisons, we include the regional male unemployment
rate as output-specific environmental variable for successful reintegration.
This variable directly relates to the employment opportunities of the dis-
charged prisoners. The unemployment rates were retrieved from the Labour
Force Survey (LFS), which is the largest household survey in the UK and
provides the official measures of unemployment.
Prison characteristics. Input requirements depend on the security level of
prisoners (Butler and Johnson, 1997). While we focus on ‘similar’ local pris-
ons, the three aspects of prison operation can still be conditioned by the
heterogeneity in prisoner inflow. To take this heterogeneity into account, we
include the ‘predicted rate of re-offending ’ in an establishment as an envi-
ronmental variable. The probability of re-offending is estimated at prison
level by the Ministry of Justice (2011), based on prisoner-level data on social
background, ethnicity, crime type, etc.
Furthermore, we control in our analysis of scale economies for prison age.
Renewing and rescaling the prison estate is a key part of the strategy of
the NOMS (see the Introduction). Lockyer (2013) argues that prison age
directly affects the production process of prisons. Given the large time gaps
between construction years in our sample (e.g., no prison was built between
1891 and 1991), we divide the prisons in the sample into 3 age categories:
prisons opened before 1837 (category 1), prisons opened between 1837 and
1901 (the Victorian era, category 2) and prisons opened after 1990 (category
3). Our sample consists of 7 prisons in the first category, 18 prisons in
the second category and 9 prisons in the third category. We include the
age categorization in the analysis as an ordered categorical environmental
variable, which may affect all three aspects of prison production.
Last, as the local prisons differ in terms of prison management (see Rogge
et al. (2015) for a discussion), we include a dummy that denotes whether the
prison is a privately managed or a public prison. For the considered period,
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we have five privately managed prisons in our dataset. G4S Justice Services
(G4S) manages HMP Altcourse, HMP Birmingham (since October 2011) and
HMP Parc. HMP Doncaster is managed by Serco Custodial Services (Serco)
and HMP Forest Bank is managed by Sodexo Justice Services (SJS).
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Year Mean St.Dev. 0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Prison inputs
Overall resource expenditures per prisoner 2009/10 36601.76 7321.32 27248.38 32391.31 34962.52 38092.25 63691.60
(overallres) 2010/11 36697.52 8020.31 24938.20 32185.38 34627.37 39343.51 65503.96
2011/12 34556.44 7150.36 23736.67 30400.02 32253.57 36836.95 59392.22
Incarceration
Certified normal accommodation 2009/10 666.21 291.94 145.00 449.25 646.67 872.75 1186.00
(cna) 2010/11 688.76 299.74 146.00 464.50 682.00 938.00 1187.00
2011/12 679.00 299.86 162.00 466.00 642.50 906.00 1187.00
Activities
Average prison population 2009/10 879.63 351.71 232.92 638.02 843.92 1165.77 1653.58
(avpop) 2010/11 881.38 349.07 228.00 621.00 891.50 1170.25 1621.00
2011/12 875.53 336.36 223.00 660.75 845.00 1121.75 1544.00
Average hours purposeful activity per week per prisoner 2009/10 20.63 3.72 16.29 18.09 19.91 22.29 34.98
(avpurp) 2010/11 21.32 3.83 16.90 18.68 20.48 23.30 35.20
2011/12 20.99 3.61 16.81 18.52 20.05 22.11 33.73
Average hours outside-cell per day per prisoner 2009/10 8.16 1.30 5.60 7.30 7.90 9.20 12.10
(outcell) 2010/11 8.40 1.30 5.80 7.80 8.10 9.00 12.90
2011/12 8.46 1.37 5.50 7.80 8.15 9.10 12.40
Successful reintegration
Number of Discharges 2009/10 1309.71 558.38 419.00 898.50 1207.00 1593.00 2933.00
(discharges) 2010/11 1417.60 519.15 460.00 1086.38 1376.50 1771.50 2575.50
2011/12 1525.50 576.55 417.00 1169.25 1421.00 1973.50 2839.00
Percentage of discharges with employment 2009/10 24.89 6.68 12.80 19.93 23.60 28.80 41.70
(emprate) 2010/11 27.68 7.37 14.00 22.00 28.00 31.00 44.00
2011/12 27.18 7.10 14.00 22.25 27.00 31.00 44.00
Prison characteristics
Predicted rate of re-offending 2009/10 62.76 2.84 54.16 61.61 63.00 65.05 67.17
(predreof) 2010/11 62.54 5.52 51.00 58.88 62.27 67.33 77.28
2011/12 62.09 4.76 53.40 58.87 61.20 65.91 74.18
Year of construction (age) 1888.18 68.01 1782 1842 1864.50 1991 2000
Regional characteristics
Regional male unemployment rate 2009/10 8.61 1.53 6.30 7.10 9.10 9.80 11.20
(regunemp) 2010/11 9.39 1.85 6.70 7.70 10.10 10.50 13.00
2011/12 8.19 1.42 6.20 6.60 8.30 9.40 10.30
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Table 2: Spearman rank correlogram
overallres cna avpop avpurp outcell discharges emprate predreof agecat regunemp
overallres 1.00 0.87 0.88 0.11 0.11 0.67 0.07 -0.42 0.54 0.49
cna 0.87 1.00 0.94 0.09 0.04 0.78 -0.06 -0.45 0.52 0.48
avpop 0.88 0.94 1.00 0.15 0.09 0.83 -0.13 -0.34 0.48 0.56
avpurp 0.11 0.09 0.15 1.00 0.68 0.27 0.16 -0.06 0.27 -0.06
outcell 0.11 0.04 0.09 0.68 1.00 0.15 0.27 -0.07 0.30 -0.05
discharges 0.67 0.78 0.83 0.27 0.15 1.00 -0.10 -0.33 0.46 0.46
emprate 0.07 -0.06 -0.13 0.16 0.27 -0.10 1.00 -0.42 0.01 -0.31
predreof -0.42 -0.45 -0.34 -0.06 -0.07 -0.33 -0.42 1.00 -0.25 0.02
agecat 0.54 0.52 0.48 0.27 0.30 0.46 0.01 -0.25 1.00 0.18
regunemp 0.49 0.48 0.56 -0.06 -0.05 0.46 -0.31 0.02 0.18 1.00
Table 2 shows the correlation between outputs, input and environmental
variables. Output variables that relate to qualitative aspects of prison pro-
duction are scaled per prisoner as in Table 1. There is modest correlation
between input and outputs (even if not scaled per prisoner), indicating there
can be deviations from optimal conduct or effects from the heterogeneity in
the operating environment. Overall resources are positively associated with
higher numbers of purposeful activity per prisoner (avpurp) and with time
outside-cell (outcell). Prison characteristics are related to the size of the
prison. The correlation between input and respectively the predicted rate
of re-offending and the ordered prison age category, is respectively -0.42 and
0.54. Stated differently, larger prisons are generally more recently built and
incarcerate prisoners with characteristics that imply a lower expected rate
of re-offending. Conditioning on the operating environment is thus needed
to meaningfully analyze returns to scale. The regional unemployment rate
is negatively related to employment at discharge. Overall, Table 2 indicates
a single output analysis cannot capture the production process of prisons
as it would imply an omitted variable bias. We need an empirical analy-
sis that includes multi-output structure and environmental heterogeneity to
meaningfully estimate output-specific returns to scale in prison production.
4. Results
The methodology allows for a simultaneous analysis of output-specific
scale efficiency and technical efficiency. We first discuss the results on scale
efficiency in subsection 4.1 and subsequently turn to technical efficiency in
subsection 4.2. As discussed in the methodology section, the order-m sub-
sample bootstrapping routine (with m=50 and 1000 random draws)10 is ap-
10The value of m is chosen on the basis of visually inspecting the relation between the
proportion of observations with ϕm(v) < 1 and the value of m as in Daraio and Simar
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plied to lower the sensitivity of the efficiency estimates to potential outliers
and extreme noise. In particular, the order-m efficiency measure is computed
as the average over all draws. The order-m efficiency score can be interpreted
as the expected efficiency score relative to a subsample ofm = 50 prisons. Ta-
ble 8 in Appendix C shows the prison-specific and output-specific bandwidth
sizes, which are the basis for the weighted bootstrap routine to include influ-
ences of environmental variables. Overall, prison age and prison management
categories are estimated to have highly dissimilar production environments,
as represented by the bandwidth sizes of the Liracine kernels that are close
to the lower bound 0, meaning nearly no weight is given to observations from
other categories. The direction of influence of the environmental variables is
discussed in Appendix C.
4.1. Output-specific returns to scale and scale efficiency
By applying the advocated framework on the empirical prison production
model, we can examine whether output-specific returns to scale estimates
differ considerably over outputs, implying a prison size dilemma for the public
policy maker.
Incarceration. Figure 3(a) shows returns to scale estimates and scale effi-
ciency when the focus is solely on incarceration. The higher the values above
1, the more room for improvement. Scale efficiency estimates for the small
and large prisons have values surpassing 1.5, indicating potential efficiency
gains of over 50% by rescaling these prisons. These results are not surprising,
since the cost per place varies between 31200 and 65500 pounds per year.
Given that the estimates are conditional upon the environment, it is pos-
sible for example that a particular prison is characterized by increasing re-
turns to scale and that an even smaller prison is characterized by decreasing
returns to scale. The reason is that both prisons are situated in a different en-
vironment. Although there is overlap between the returns to scale estimates,
Figure 3(a) shows a clear pattern. Smaller prisons are generally character-
ized by increasing returns to scale and larger prisons are characterized by
decreasing returns to scale.
Over the three book years, we find that 52 observations are characterized
with decreasing returns to scale and 45 with increasing returns to scale.
For respectively 35 and 32 observations the returns to scale estimates are
(2007a).
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significant at the 95% confidence level (see Table 5, 6 and 7). We find 5
prisons characterized by constant returns to scale, whereof 3 significant at
the 95% confidence level. The returns to scale estimates show no year- specific
patterns.
The optimal scale size in terms of resources is situated between 23 and 37
million pounds. In terms of Certified Normal Accommodation, the prisons
characterized by constant returns to scale provide between 554 and 1187
places. We therefore conclude that the optimal scale size of a prison with
respect to incarceration is medium scale, depending on the environment.
Activities. Figure 3(b) shows the estimates for the models that include the
output variables that proxy purposeful and outside-cell activities to promote
humane incarceration and to prepare inmates for reintegration into society.
With this focus, we characterize 50 observations with drs, 42 with irs and 10
with crs. For respectively 46, 24 and 5 observations this is significant at the
95% confidence level. Overall, we find a similar pattern of returns to scale
and scale efficiency as for the model focusing on incarceration. Focusing on
purposeful and outside-cell activities, the prisons characterized by constant
returns to scale provide between 322 and 1073 places. In terms of resources,
the optimal scale size to provide activities is a little more spread than before.
Successful reintegration. For successful reintegration we characterize respec-
tively 69, 25 and 8 observations with respectively drs, irs and crs. For respec-
tively 47, 18 and 7 observations the rts estimates are significant. Figure 3(b)
shows a pattern of returns to scale and scale efficiency which highly differs in
terms of optimal scale size over the considered environmental variables. The
most productive scale size is in the broad interval of 11 to 49 million pounds
and corresponds to prisons with a number of places between 221 and 1064.
Although smaller prisons can be optimal to provide reintegration, we find
just as well medium scale prisons with an optimal scale size. Most probably,
successful reintegration is highly dependent on unobserved heterogeneity in
the effectiveness of reintegration programmes which is given the sample of
observations difficult to disentangle from economies of scale.
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(a) Incarceration
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(c) Successful reintegration
Figure 3: Returns to scale and scale efficiency, in function of overall resource
expenditure, for each of the three output-objectives.
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In sum, our results over the three considered outputs reject the idea that
public managers are faced with a prison size dilemma, which implies a choice
between cost-per-place performance and social performance. We cannot re-
ject medium scale to be optimal. Of course, the optimal scale size depends on
the operating environment. For both incarceration and providing purposeful
and outside-cell activities, we find supportive evidence that a medium scale
size is optimal. For successful reintegration, we find no supportive evidence
for drastic productivity gains by moving towards a very small or large prison
scale.
Prison-specific estimates. The overall finding that there is no prison size
dilemma requires further prison-level consideration. Table 5, 6 and 7 in ap-
pendix show that for 14 observations, we do find a prison size dilemma in
the sense that we estimate a prison with output-specific technologies to be
simultaneously characterized by drs and irs, both significant at the 95%
confidence level. For example, for HMP Exeter in book years 2010/11 and
2011/12, we find it is optimal to scale down prison scale to improve suc-
cessful reintegration and scale up prison scale to improve the provision of
purposeful and outside-cell activities and keeping convicts outside society by
incarceration. From an operational viewpoint, allowing for output-specific
and environment-specific returns to scale can be a valuable tool to provide
policy advice on re-scaling prison conduct, taking the complexity of multi-
output production into account.
4.2. Technical efficiency
Table 3 shows conditional order-m technical efficiency estimates for the
variable returns to scale model (ϕm(v)) and the constant returns to scale
model (ϕm(c)). Conditional order-m efficiency is reached when ϕm = 1. Note
that the prison under evaluation is not necessarily included in the randomly
drawn subsamples. Consequently, the order-m efficiency scores might be
smaller than one. If the efficiency score is smaller than one, a prison is
called super efficient. Overall, values of ϕm larger than one indicate that,
on the basis of a subsample of m prisons, we estimate that there is room to
proportionally increase the production, given the input and environment.
The first two columns show the respective vrs and crs results for the
three outputs analyzed simultaneously, but allowing for output-specific tech-
nologies. The other columns show the results for the models that include
only one output next to the input and output-specific environment.
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Table 3 shows the technical efficiency of local male prisons in England and
Wales is improving over time. Considering the multi-output model, on aver-
age, the room for increasing production went from 4 percent in 2009/10 to
less than 0 percent (thus indicating super efficiency) in 2011/12. Stated dif-
ferently, our estimates support the idea that the public policy of the coalition
at place since 2010 was, at least partly, successful in reducing inefficiencies.
Still, some prisons considerably and persistently underperform (see Table 5,
6 and 7 in appendix). For example, technical efficiency of HMP Belmarsh
is estimated to be respectively 1.29, 1.25 and 1.25 in the three consecutive
book years considered.
In sum, using the advocated framework to consider multi-output prison
production, we are able to pinpoint low performers in terms of both scale effi-
ciency and technical efficiency. The persistent low performers require further
attention from public managers. Are there additional prison characteristics
that could explain the low figures?
Table 3: Mean (standard deviation) of conditional order-m efficiency scores for
m=50 and B=1000
Multi-Output Incarceration Activities Reintegration
Year ϕm(v) ϕm(c) ϕm,1(v) ϕm,1(c) ϕm,2(v) ϕm,2(c) ϕm,3(v) ϕm,3(c)
2009/10 1,04 1,28 1,12 1,43 1,11 1,37 1,67 2,36
(0,13) (0,29) (0,16) (0,31) (0,20) (0,38) (0,68) (0,90)
2010/11 1,01 1,19 1,07 1,37 1,09 1,29 1,33 1,93
(0,06) (0,24) (0,11) (0,30) (0,16) (0,33) (0,48) (0,89)
2011/12 0,98 1,14 1,05 1,32 1,04 1,23 1,31 1,87
(0,06) (0,21) (0,13) (0,30) (0,14) (0,30) (0,68) (1,25)
4.3. Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis shows that our results are robust when altering the
specification of the prison production model and including additional quali-
tative variables related to the prison production process.
Firstly, we include an additional qualitative variable in the model related
to safety and the quality of life within prison, by employing data on the
number of prisoner-on-officer assaults. It is worth to note that data on the
number of prisoner-on-prisoner assaults is also available, but these numbers
are less reliable since incidents between prisoners often remain unreported.
The number of prisoner-on-officer assaults per prison per year varies between
3 and 102, with an average over all observations of 35 incidents per year.
Since the number of prisoner-on-officer assaults is an undesirable output, we
use one divided by the number of prisoner-on-officer assaults as a proxy for
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Figure 4: Returns to scale and scale efficiency for incarceration, taking assaults
into account.
safety and the quality of life within prison. We include this proxy as an
additional variable for the incarceration output and repeat the analysis as a
robustness check for our conclusions with respect to the optimal scale size of
prisons. We dropped one observation due to a missing value for the number of
prisoner-on-officer assaults and consequently performed the robustness check
for 101 observations. The average order-m efficiency for incarceration equals
1,08 under variable returns to scale and 1,31 under constant returns to scale.
These efficiency scores are slightly lower than the scores in the original model,
due to the inclusion of an additional output. Figure 4 plots the returns to
scale and scale efficiency for the incarceration output, taking prisoner-on-
officer assaults into account. The general pattern remains similar to Figure
3(a). On average, the scale efficiency equals 1,21. When including assaults,
12 observations are characterized by constant returns to scale. Remarkably,
3 of those observations correspond to smaller scale prisons. However, most
smaller scale prisons remain scale inefficient.
Similarly, we extend the model to include accommodation at release,
which is a necessary condition of successful reintegration. In particular, we
include the percentage of prisoners with accommodation at release times the
number of discharges in a prison. The percentage of prisoners having ac-
commodation at release varies between 67% and 100%. On average, 88%
of prisoners have accommodation at release. The average order-m efficiency
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score for the reintegration output is respectively 1,25 and 1,68 under vari-
able and constant returns to scale. Including accommodation at release, 17
observations are characterized by constant returns to scale. Figure 5 shows
that the optimal scale sizes remain equally scattered as in the original model,
however, medium-scale prisons tend to be slightly more scale efficient when
taking accommodation at release into account. We conclude that our main
findings are robust to including additional qualitative variables.
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Figure 5: Returns to scale and scale efficiency for successful reintegration, taking
accommodation at release into account
Furthermore, we have investigated whether our results are robust to in-
cluding additional socio-economic environmental variables in our prison pro-
duction model. In particular, we focused on the regional deflated GDP per
capita as a continuous environmental variable and the region as a categorical
environmental variable. The results (available upon request) show that our
findings are robust for including additional regional characteristics. Overall,
we find no indications that our results concerning successful reintegration are
driven by regional heterogeneity.
Next, we have tested whether there might be a time lag on the prison
production process. To be concrete, we linked the inputs of a particular year
to the output of the following year. In the model with time lag, the expenses
of the book year 2009/2010 are linked to the output of the year 2010/2011
and the expenses of 2010/2011 are linked to the output of 2011/2012. We
obtain a dataset with 68 observations. Since this dataset is smaller than the
29
original dataset with 102 observations, we select the observations from the
book years 2010/2011 and 2011/2012 to obtain a sample also consisting of 68
observations, in which the expenses of the prison are linked to output in the
same book year. Table 4 shows the results of the model with and without
a time lag. However, both models result into comparable average efficiency
scores.
Table 4: Mean (standard deviation) of model with and without time lag (N=68)
.
Multi-Output Incarceration Activities Reintegration
ϕ(v) ϕ(c) ϕ1(v) ϕ1(c) SE1 ϕ2(v) ϕ2(c) SE2 ϕ3(v) ϕ3(c) SE3
Lag 1,01 1,15 1,07 1,33 1,25 1,06 1,26 1,18 1,19 1,47 1,24
(0,08) (0,21) (0,14) (0,28) (0,23) (0,14) (0,31) (0,18) (0,40) (0,53) (0,27)
No 1,01 1,14 1,05 1,33 1,27 1,06 1,25 1,17 1,22 1,57 1,26
lag (0,06) (0,22) (0,11) (0,28) (0,25) (0,12) (0,30) (0,18) (0,44) (0,80) (0,27)
5. Conclusion
There is little reason to expect public firms to operate on their optimal
scale size in the absence of competitive pressure. For prisons in England and
Wales, there is a widespread policy debate concerning whether very small
housing blocks or very large, so called ‘titan’ prisons are the solution to
improve the productivity of prisons. The general belief is that small prisons
can provide a safe and humane environment wherein prisoners can be well
prepared to reintegrate into society and large prisons are especially effective
when the focus is on expenditures-per-prisoner. If indeed the case, public
managers would face a prison size dilemma. However, it is unclear whether
the observed data support the idea of a prison size dilemma, as the policy
debate does not go beyond an anecdotal discussion at most supported with
partial indicators of reintegration and costs.
We provide a thorough examination of economies of scale using a complete
multi-output assessment that allows for interlinkages between the output of
incarcerating convicts and qualitative outputs (i.e., purposeful and outside-
cell activity, successful reintegration) and allows that economies of scale can
differ between the different qualitative dimensions of production.
Although our focus is on economies of scale in prisons, it is worth to note
that the advocated methodological framework is more generally applicable
to multi-output public sector organizations and multi-output manufactur-
ing plants. For example Duncombe and Yinger (1993) study economies of
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scale in different dimensions of public production, with an application to fire
protection.
With respect to prisons in England and Wales, we do not find supportive
evidence for the idea that public managers are confronted with a prison size
dilemma. The main conclusion is that we cannot reject medium scale to
be optimal. This conclusion is supported by two observations. Observation
1: depending on the operating environment, we find that medium scale size
is optimal for both incarceration and providing purposeful and outside-cell
activities. Observation 2: for successful reintegration, the results are mixed,
but we do not find indications for drastic productivity gains by moving to-
wards a very small prison scale.
Our results are therefore supportive for a policy oriented towards ‘titan’
prisons, which are operated as a number of semi-autonomous units sharing a
common site and set of services. However, it is worth noting that our results
are based on a given set of observations of prison production. The build-
ing of very small and very large prisons can coincide with the introduction
of new technologies, making extrapolation from the observed set of prison
production difficult. Further research is needed to examine the optimal scale
size to introduce productivity enhancing technological innovations.
Furthermore, the pillar of the UK 2010 coalition concerning the reduction
of technical inefficiencies within-prison is estimated to be, at least partly,
successful. The technical efficiency is improving over the considered period
2009/10-2011/12 with the exception of the output successful reintegration.
We demonstrate the value of the multi-output production framework to
analyze and test for output-specific scale (dis-)economies, using publicly
available local prison data provided by the Ministry of Justice. As such,
we provide a framework to test the success of recent policies to lower average
costs by changing the scale of prisons.
This paper introduces a framework that fosters further research. First,
the Ministry of Justice could further increase the discriminatory power of the
methodology by applying the advocated methodology with detailed informa-
tion on the allocation of expenses to outputs and obtain even more detailed
insight into the multi-output production process of prisons. Second, while
we consider the prison size dilemma, both public and private sector policy
making is confronted with similar rescaling dilemmas. Examples include the
debate on rescaling local police departments and the optimal scale size of
bank branches. Last but not least, further research is needed on whether
key findings from the productivity decomposition literature (e.g. at the firm-
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level or aggregated at the sector-level or country-level) are sensitive for the
introduction of varying scale efficiency over outputs.
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Appendix
A. Proof of proposition 1.
Proof. We first verify that Pˆ r(Xrn, rts
r) satisfies Axioms 1 - 5. Axiom 4 fol-
lows from the definition of βrn and Pˆ
r(Xrn, rts
r). Since βrn(X
r
n, rts
r) = 1 and
n ∈ Crn(rtsr), we have that yrn ∈ Pˆ r(Xrn, rtsr). Moreover, Axioms 1 and 3
follow directly from the construction of Pˆ r(Xrn, rts
r) as the convex-monotone
hull of the scaled output vectors of the DMUs in the set Crn(rts
r). To ver-
ify Axiom 2, suppose that Xr ≤ Xr∗. By definition of βrs , we have that
βrs(X
r, rtsr) ≤ βrs(Xr∗, rtsr) and consequently Crn(rtsr) ⊂ Cr∗n (rtsr). This
implies that Pˆ r(Xr, rtsr) ⊆ Pˆ r(Xr∗, rtsr). Lastly, Axiom 5, is satisfied since
βrs(k
rXr, rtsr) = krβrs(X
r, rtsr) for all kr ∈ K(rtsr). Then yr ∈ Pˆ r(Xr, rtsr)
implies that kryr ∈ Pˆ r(krXr, rtsr) for kr ∈ K(rtsr). We conclude that
Pˆ r(Xrn, rts
r) satisfies Axioms 1 - 5.
It remains to prove that for any P r(Xrn, rts
r) that satisfies Axioms 1 to
5, we have that Pˆ r(Xrn, rts
r) ⊆ P r(Xrn, rtsr). Take any yr∗ ∈ Pˆ r(Xrn, rtsr).
We need to prove that yr∗ ∈ P r(Xrn, rtsr). By the definition of Pˆ r(Xrn, rtsr),
we have given that
yr∗ ≤
∑
s∈Crn(rtsr)
λrsβ
r
s(X
r
n, rts
r)yrs
for some λrs ≥ 0 such that
∑
s∈Crn(rtsr) λ
r
s = 1. We can now prove that
yr∗ ∈ P r(Xrn, rtsr) by using that P r(Xrn, rtsr) satisfies Axioms 1 to 5. First,
Axiom 4 implies that yrs ∈ P r(Xrs, rtsr)∀s. Using Axiom 5 we have that
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βrs(X
r
n, rts
r)yrs ∈ P r(βrs(Xrn, rtsr)Xrs, rtsr). By definition of βrs we have that
βrs(X
r
n, rts
r)Xrs ≤ Xrn. Together with Axiom 2 this implies that
βrs(X
r
n, rts
r)yrs ∈ P r(Xrn, rtsr) ∀s.
Combining the definition of Pˆ r(Xrn, rts
r) with Axiom 3, this results into
yr∗ ≤
∑
s∈Crn(rtsn)
λrsβ
r
s(X
r
n, rts
r)yrs ∈ P r(Xrn, rtsr)
for λrs ≥ 0 such that
∑
s∈Crn(rtsr) λ
r
s = 1. Finally, Axiom 1 implies that
yr∗ ∈ P r(Xrn, rtsr).
B. Prison-specific estimates
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Table 5: Order-m efficiency scores and returns to scale estimates for m = 50 and B = 1000 (2009/10)
Year 2009/10 Multi Output Incarceration Activities Reintegration
Prison ϕ(v) ϕ(c) ϕ1(v) ϕ1(c) SE1 RTS ϕ2(v) ϕ2(c) SE2 RTS ϕ3(v) ϕ3(c) SE3 RTS
Altcourse (G4S) 1,00 1,00 1,26 1,79 1,42 d*** 1,00 1,01 1,01 d*** 1,00 1,00 1,00 c**
Bedford 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,13 1,13 d 1,00 1,07 1,07 d 1,00 1,00 1,00 c***
Belmarsh 1,29 2,14 1,29 2,14 1,65 d*** 1,77 2,81 1,59 d*** 3,61 4,20 1,16 d***
Birmingham 0,99 1,21 1,07 1,25 1,17 d*** 0,99 1,21 1,22 d** 1,17 1,63 1,39 d
Bristol 0,99 1,08 1,17 1,39 1,19 i 0,99 1,08 1,09 i* 1,60 2,12 1,32 d***
Brixton 1,00 1,13 1,00 1,13 1,13 d 1,41 1,70 1,21 d** 2,12 2,75 1,30 d*
Bullingdon 1,00 1,19 1,14 1,19 1,05 d* 1,00 1,20 1,19 i 2,22 3,21 1,45 d
Cardiff 1,02 1,20 1,02 1,23 1,20 d 1,03 1,20 1,17 d** 1,47 2,04 1,39 d*
Chelmsford 1,02 1,10 1,02 1,10 1,08 d 1,21 1,30 1,08 d** 1,30 1,48 1,14 d*
Doncaster (Serco) 1,00 1,14 1,00 1,18 1,19 i*** 1,02 1,14 1,12 d** 1,08 2,04 1,89 i**
Dorchester 1,00 1,99 1,07 1,99 1,86 i*** 1,00 2,12 2,11 i*** 1,14 2,24 1,97 i***
Durham 1,06 1,29 1,09 1,29 1,18 d** 1,06 1,35 1,28 d** 2,48 3,92 1,58 d*
Exeter 0,96 1,15 1,02 1,59 1,57 i*** 0,96 1,15 1,19 i* 1,49 2,15 1,44 d
Forest Bank (SJS) 1,00 1,02 1,14 1,16 1,03 d 1,00 1,02 1,02 d*** 1,03 2,24 2,16 i***
Gloucester 1,00 1,30 1,00 1,30 1,30 i*** 1,05 1,33 1,26 i*** 1,39 1,53 1,10 d*
High Down 1,04 1,15 1,04 1,15 1,11 d*** 1,45 1,59 1,10 d* 1,29 2,12 1,64 i
Holme House 1,00 1,15 1,00 1,15 1,15 i*** 1,09 1,70 1,56 i* 2,22 3,15 1,42 d***
Hull 0,98 1,08 1,00 1,25 1,25 d 0,98 1,08 1,11 i 1,70 2,71 1,60 d**
Leeds 1,00 1,29 1,00 1,30 1,30 i 1,17 1,29 1,11 d* 1,06 1,57 1,48 d
Leicester 0,97 1,28 1,07 1,48 1,38 i*** 1,01 1,57 1,55 i*** 0,97 1,28 1,32 i***
Lewes 1,00 1,20 1,00 1,20 1,20 i* 1,21 1,31 1,08 i 2,17 2,32 1,07 d
Lincoln 1,06 1,28 1,09 1,56 1,43 i*** 1,06 1,28 1,21 i*** 1,08 1,47 1,36 i
Liverpool 1,00 1,02 1,00 1,02 1,02 d* 1,01 1,03 1,02 d* 1,76 2,73 1,56 d***
Manchester 0,98 1,21 1,23 1,65 1,34 d*** 0,98 1,21 1,24 d*** 1,90 2,64 1,39 d
Norwich 1,14 1,32 1,14 1,38 1,21 i 1,23 1,32 1,07 i 1,74 2,06 1,18 d
Nottingham 1,51 1,64 1,63 1,99 1,22 i 1,51 1,64 1,09 i 3,46 4,36 1,26 d
Parc (G4S) 1,00 1,34 1,20 1,61 1,34 d*** 1,00 1,34 1,34 d*** 1,14 2,66 2,32 i***
Pentonville 1,21 1,49 1,29 1,49 1,16 d*** 1,21 1,49 1,23 d*** 1,63 2,19 1,35 d
Preston 1,00 1,23 1,37 1,63 1,19 d 1,06 1,23 1,16 i 1,00 1,32 1,32 d*
Swansea 0,85 1,34 0,85 1,92 2,25 i*** 0,85 1,34 1,57 i*** 1,21 2,09 1,74 i***
Wandsworth 0,98 1,20 1,07 1,44 1,35 d*** 0,98 1,20 1,23 d*** 2,19 3,15 1,44 d
Winchester 0,97 1,04 1,22 1,41 1,15 i 0,97 1,04 1,08 i 2,29 2,37 1,03 d
Woodhill 1,43 2,11 1,54 2,12 1,38 d*** 1,55 2,11 1,36 d* 1,43 2,21 1,55 i
Wormwood Scrubs 1,01 1,13 1,01 1,13 1,12 d*** 1,02 1,17 1,15 d*** 2,57 4,38 1,70 d**
Mean 1,04 1,28 1,12 1,43 1,29 1,11 1,37 1,23 1,67 2,36 1,44
(Standard Deviation) (0,13) (0,29) (0,16) (0,31) (0,25) (0,20) (0,38) (0,22) (0,68) (0,90) (0,31)
Note: + indicates over 90% of the subsample bootstrap replications show the value, ∗ indicates 95%, ∗∗ indicates 99%
and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicates 99.9%.
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Table 6: Order-m efficiency scores and returns to scale estimates for m = 50 and B = 1000 (2010/11)
Year 2010/11 Multi Output Incarceration Activities Reintegration
Prison ϕ(v) ϕ(c) ϕ1(v) ϕ1(c) SE1 RTS ϕ2(v) ϕ2(c) SE2 RTS ϕ3(v) ϕ3(c) SE3 RTS
Altcourse (G4S) 1,00 1,14 1,27 1,91 1,50 d*** 1,00 1,14 1,13 d*** 1,08 1,14 1,06 d**
Bedford 0,98 1,01 1,00 1,23 1,24 i*** 1,00 1,07 1,07 d* 0,98 1,01 1,03 i
Belmarsh 1,25 2,14 1,25 2,14 1,71 d*** 1,59 2,61 1,64 d*** 2,61 5,12 1,96 d***
Birmingham 0,98 1,07 1,07 1,26 1,18 d*** 0,98 1,07 1,09 d* 1,18 2,10 1,79 d**
Bristol 1,00 1,06 1,17 1,36 1,16 i 1,00 1,06 1,06 i 1,04 1,37 1,32 d***
Brixton 1,09 1,28 1,09 1,28 1,18 d* 1,41 1,77 1,26 d** 1,80 2,76 1,53 d*
Bullingdon 1,00 1,01 1,00 1,13 1,13 i*** 1,00 1,01 1,01 c 2,07 2,80 1,35 d***
Cardiff 1,01 1,18 1,02 1,20 1,18 d 1,01 1,18 1,16 d** 1,31 1,76 1,35 d
Chelmsford 1,02 1,08 1,02 1,08 1,07 d 1,08 1,14 1,06 d 1,11 1,33 1,19 d
Doncaster (Serco) 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,09 1,09 i 1,00 1,00 1,00 c** 1,01 1,73 1,71 i***
Dorchester 1,00 1,76 1,09 1,76 1,62 i*** 1,00 1,82 1,83 i*** 1,20 2,20 1,84 i***
Durham 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,10 1,10 d*** 1,02 1,09 1,07 d* 1,00 1,00 1,00 c***
Exeter 1,00 1,23 1,00 1,39 1,39 i*** 1,01 1,23 1,21 i*** 1,37 1,89 1,38 d*
Forest Bank (SJS) 1,00 1,00 1,01 1,10 1,09 d*** 1,00 1,03 1,03 d*** 1,00 1,00 1,00 c***
Gloucester 1,00 1,22 1,00 1,23 1,23 i*** 1,00 1,22 1,22 i*** 1,21 1,27 1,05 d*
High Down 1,00 1,07 1,00 1,07 1,07 d* 1,25 1,32 1,06 d* 1,77 2,57 1,45 d**
Holme House 1,00 1,06 1,00 1,06 1,06 d*** 1,47 1,64 1,11 i 1,58 2,95 1,87 d***
Hull 0,99 1,12 1,00 1,17 1,17 d 0,99 1,12 1,13 i 1,23 2,08 1,69 d***
Leeds 1,00 1,20 1,00 1,30 1,30 i 1,11 1,20 1,08 d* 1,05 1,66 1,58 d
Leicester 0,98 1,45 1,07 1,48 1,38 i*** 1,01 1,45 1,44 i*** 0,98 1,47 1,50 i***
Lewes 0,94 1,09 0,94 1,13 1,21 i** 1,15 1,51 1,32 i*** 0,99 1,09 1,10 i*
Lincoln 1,00 1,34 1,10 1,58 1,43 i*** 1,04 1,41 1,35 i*** 1,00 1,34 1,33 i
Liverpool 1,00 1,01 1,00 1,01 1,02 d 1,00 1,04 1,04 d* 1,25 1,92 1,54 d**
Manchester 1,01 1,17 1,23 1,69 1,37 d*** 1,01 1,17 1,15 d*** 1,28 2,63 2,06 d***
Norwich 0,98 1,01 1,00 1,23 1,23 i** 0,98 1,01 1,03 i 1,14 1,25 1,10 d
Nottingham 1,03 1,10 1,04 1,52 1,45 i 1,03 1,10 1,06 d* 1,64 2,40 1,46 d
Parc (G4S) 1,08 1,51 1,08 1,63 1,51 d*** 1,37 1,51 1,10 d*** 3,06 3,28 1,07 d***
Pentonville 1,08 1,32 1,27 1,43 1,13 d*** 1,11 1,32 1,18 d*** 1,08 1,43 1,32 d
Preston 1,00 1,12 1,31 1,52 1,16 d 1,00 1,12 1,12 i 1,00 1,46 1,46 d***
Swansea 0,90 1,26 0,94 1,97 2,09 i*** 0,93 1,26 1,35 i*** 0,90 1,26 1,39 i***
Wandsworth 1,07 1,28 1,07 1,41 1,32 d*** 1,07 1,28 1,19 d*** 1,77 3,53 1,99 d***
Winchester 0,98 1,04 1,00 1,16 1,17 i 0,98 1,04 1,06 i 1,24 1,63 1,31 d***
Woodhill 1,03 1,09 1,32 1,86 1,41 d*** 1,26 1,82 1,44 d* 1,03 1,09 1,06 d***
Wormwood Scrubs 1,01 1,08 1,01 1,08 1,08 d*** 1,12 1,23 1,10 d** 1,24 2,08 1,67 d***
Mean 1,01 1,19 1,07 1,37 1,28 1,09 1,29 1,18 1,33 1,93 1,43
(Standard Deviation) (0,06) (0,24) (0,11) (0,30) (0,22) (0,16) (0,33) (0,18) (0,48) (0,89) (0,31)
Note: + indicates over 90% of the subsample bootstrap replications show the value, ∗ indicates 95%, ∗∗ indicates 99%
and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicates 99.9%.
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Table 7: Order-m efficiency scores and returns to scale estimates for m = 50 and B = 1000 (2011/12)
Year 2011/12 Multi Output Incarceration Activities Reintegration
Prison ϕ(v) ϕ(c) ϕ1(v) ϕ1(c) SE1 RTS ϕ2(v) ϕ2(c) SE2 RTS ϕ3(v) ϕ3(c) SE3 RTS
Altcourse (G4S) 1,00 1,15 1,25 1,77 1,41 d*** 1,00 1,15 1,15 d*** 1,00 1,24 1,24 i***
Bedford 0,98 1,00 0,99 1,15 1,16 i*** 1,00 1,00 1,01 c* 0,98 1,06 1,08 i***
Belmarsh 1,25 2,02 1,25 2,02 1,61 d*** 1,59 2,43 1,53 d*** 2,53 4,00 1,58 d***
Birmingham (G4S) 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,37 1,37 i*** 1,00 1,29 1,29 i*** 1,00 1,00 1,00 c***
Bristol 0,95 1,08 0,95 1,29 1,35 i*** 0,96 1,08 1,12 i 1,00 1,23 1,23 d*
Brixton 1,06 1,21 1,06 1,21 1,15 d 1,39 1,59 1,15 d** 2,03 2,47 1,22 d*
Bullingdon 1,00 1,08 1,00 1,12 1,12 i*** 1,01 1,08 1,06 c 1,82 2,44 1,34 d***
Cardiff 1,01 1,19 1,01 1,19 1,18 d 1,15 1,33 1,17 d** 1,17 1,55 1,33 d
Chelmsford 0,99 1,00 0,99 1,02 1,03 c 0,99 1,00 1,01 c* 1,25 1,32 1,06 d*
Doncaster (Serco) 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,04 1,04 i 1,00 1,00 1,00 c** 1,02 1,93 1,89 i***
Dorchester 0,84 1,57 0,84 1,57 1,87 i*** 0,91 1,90 2,09 i*** 0,98 1,77 1,81 i***
Durham 0,98 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 c*** 0,98 1,02 1,04 i 1,00 1,00 1,00 c***
Exeter 0,96 1,16 0,96 1,39 1,44 i*** 0,98 1,16 1,18 i*** 1,00 1,34 1,34 d*
Forest Bank (SJS) 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,04 1,04 d 1,00 1,00 1,00 c*** 1,00 1,34 1,34 i***
Gloucester 0,99 1,00 0,99 1,19 1,20 i*** 1,00 1,21 1,21 i*** 0,99 1,00 1,00 c*
High Down 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 c* 1,15 1,29 1,12 d 1,58 2,15 1,36 d*
Holme House 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 c*** 1,00 1,24 1,24 i 1,53 2,35 1,53 d***
Hull 0,94 1,09 0,98 1,12 1,14 d 0,94 1,09 1,15 i 1,28 1,89 1,48 d***
Leeds 0,94 0,98 0,98 1,28 1,31 i 0,94 0,98 1,04 c 1,12 1,65 1,46 d
Leicester 0,96 1,28 1,07 1,38 1,29 i*** 0,99 1,28 1,29 i*** 0,96 2,01 2,10 i***
Lewes 0,98 1,01 0,98 1,14 1,16 i** 0,99 1,26 1,27 i*** 1,00 1,01 1,01 c
Lincoln 0,96 1,16 1,06 1,52 1,43 i*** 0,96 1,16 1,21 i*** 1,01 1,30 1,28 i
Liverpool 0,95 1,00 0,95 1,00 1,05 c 0,98 1,02 1,05 d 1,16 1,72 1,49 d*
Manchester 1,00 1,10 1,23 1,61 1,31 d*** 1,00 1,10 1,10 d*** 1,95 3,84 1,97 d***
Norwich 0,93 1,00 1,00 1,19 1,19 i*** 0,93 1,00 1,08 c 1,01 1,06 1,05 d
Nottingham 0,93 0,98 1,01 1,38 1,37 i 0,93 0,98 1,05 c 0,98 1,25 1,28 i
Parc (G4S) 1,00 1,45 1,00 1,47 1,47 d*** 1,16 1,45 1,25 d*** 4,51 7,62 1,69 d***
Pentonville 0,97 1,13 1,29 1,34 1,04 d* 1,10 1,19 1,07 d*** 0,97 1,13 1,17 d
Preston 1,00 1,10 1,25 1,43 1,15 d 1,00 1,10 1,11 i 1,12 1,66 1,48 d***
Swansea 0,97 1,19 0,98 2,06 2,10 i*** 0,97 1,25 1,29 i*** 1,05 1,19 1,13 i*
Wandsworth 1,00 1,16 1,08 1,36 1,26 d*** 1,00 1,16 1,16 d*** 1,44 2,77 1,93 d***
Winchester 0,93 1,12 0,93 1,12 1,20 i** 0,98 1,14 1,16 i*** 1,09 1,31 1,20 d
Woodhill 1,00 1,39 1,51 2,02 1,34 d*** 1,25 1,70 1,37 d*** 1,00 1,39 1,39 d***
Wormwood Scrubs 1,00 1,05 1,01 1,05 1,04 d* 1,19 1,24 1,05 d*** 1,00 1,59 1,59 d***
Mean 0,98 1,14 1,05 1,32 1,26 1,04 1,23 1,18 1,31 1,87 1,38
(Standard Deviation) (0,06) (0,21) (0,13) (0,30) (0,24) (0,14) (0,30) (0,20) (0,68) (1,25) (0,30)
Note: + indicates over 90% of the subsample bootstrap replications show the value, ∗ indicates 95%, ∗∗ indicates 99%
and ∗ ∗ ∗ indicates 99.9%.
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C. Environmental variables
Daraio and Simar (2005) introduce a probabilistic approach to condi-
tion on environmental factors. To apply the probabilistic approach, a kernel
function and appropriate bandwidth need to be estimated. Following Li and
Racine (2007) we use a generalized product kernel to allow for both con-
tinuous and discrete environmental variables. For the continuous data, we
use Epanechnikov kernel weighting and for the discrete data Liracine kernel
weighting. To select the bandwidth sizes, we follow the procedure of Badin
et al. (2010), making use of least squares cross-validation. The procedure of
Badin et al. (2010) also considers the influence of the environmental variables
on the production process. Since our framework employs output-specific pro-
duction processes, we obtain output-specific bandwidth sizes. Table 8 reports
the estimated bandwidths for each environmental variable.
Table 8: Bandwidth sizes
Mean St.Dev. 0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Incarceration
Predreof 3,07 0,61 1,39 2,68 2,71 4,01 4,01
Agecat 0,02 0,04 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,15
Management 0,07 0,13 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,10 0,50
Activities
Predreof 8,23e5 4,94e6 2,67 2,70 2,79 2,93 4,15e7
Agecat 0,02 0,04 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,02 0,22
Management 0,06 0,13 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,03 0,50
Successful reintegration
Predreof 1,56 0,38 1,15 1,39 1,41 1,64 2,84
Agecat 0,77 0,35 0,08 0,57 0,97 1,00 1,00
Management 0,06 0,13 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,50
Regunemp 5,01e6 9,59e6 1,25 1,34 1,48 7,17e6 6,25e7
An advantage of the kernel weighting procedure is that there is no need
to specify a priori a direction of influence of the environmental variables. In
fact, we can obtain a posteriori indications on the direction of influence.
Daraio and Simar (2005, 2007a) explain in detail how to examine the di-
rection of the environmental effect by nonparametrically regressing the envi-
ronmental variables on the ratio of the conditional to unconditional technical
efficiency. We follow this approach and use a generalized kernel local linear
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regression (Li and Racine, 2004), again with Epanechnikov kernels for the
continuous data and Liracine kernels for the discrete data.11 A positive (neg-
ative) gradient reveals a favorable (unfavorable) effect of the environmental
variable. For discrete data, a category with higher (lower) fitted values is in-
dicated as a more (less) favorable environment. Given the data limitations,
we interpret the point estimates as indications for a direction of influence
rather than as evidence of a causal effect. Figure 6 shows the output-specific
density plots of the gradients of the nonparametric regression, for the effect
of predicted rate of re-offending. We find that the effect of the predicted rate
of re-offending, our proxy for prisoner characteristics, is indicated to be non-
monotone. Only for the output successful reintegration, the effect is clearly
unfavorable.
Similarly, Figure 7 shows the density plot of the gradients of unemploy-
ment rate for the output successful reintegration. Higher regional unemploy-
ment rate is for nearly all prisons indicated as a less favorable environment
to successfully reintegrate prisoners. This finding corresponds with the in-
tuition that a higher regional unemployment rate leads to more difficulties
finding a job at discharge. Further, Figure 8 shows the output-specific box
plots of the estimated influence of prison age. The data shows that newer
prisons do not necessarily have an operational advantage.
Finally, we consider the environmental influence of prison management
(public=0, privately managed=1) in Figure 9. We find that privately man-
aged prisons have an operational disadvantage for incarceration and an oper-
ational advantage for the provision of activities. For successful reintegration,
we find a less pronounced operational advantage for public prisons. As such,
we confirm the results of Rogge et al. (2015) that private prisons do not
outperform public prisons when considering all outputs. However, we do not
make any causality statements concerning prison management and a detailed
study of the causal effect of privatization on the performance of prisons goes
beyond the scope of this paper.
11We use the ‘np’ package of Hayfield and Racine (2008) to implement the bandwidth
selection procedure of Badin et al. (2010) and to perform the nonparametric regression,
with least squares cross validation.
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Figure 6: The impact of predicted rate of re-offending on the ratio of the condi-
tional to unconditional scores, for each output.
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Figure 7: The impact of regional male unemployment rate on the ratio of the
conditional to unconditional scores, for successful reintegration
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Figure 8: The impact of prison age on the ratio of the conditional to uncondi-
tional scores.
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Figure 9: The impact of prison management (0=public, 1=privately managed)
on the ratio of the conditional to unconditional scores.
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